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-IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 








BRIEF OF RESPONDEN1~ 
ST.A.TE:\IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant 
claiming injuries as the result of an alleged fall in one 
of the defendant's markets in Salt Lake City. Plain-
tiff clain1ed that the fall was caused by an unknown 
slippery substance on the floor. 
. 3 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The issues of fact were submitted to the jury in 
the form of a special verdict. The answers given by the 
jury found that the defendant was not negligent in 
any manner. Based upon the jury's answers, the court 
directed that judgment on the verdict be entered in 
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action on her complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff 
filed a Motion for a New Trial and argued the same 
before the trial court, Honorable A. H. Ellett presid-
ing, who denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff thereafter 
filed this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the 
judgment based upon the jury's verdict rendered in 
the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant bases her appeal exclusively upon the 
conduct of the court after the case was submitted to the 
jury. (Appellant's Brief, Page 2). The jury found 
the issues of fact in favor of the respondent. The appel-
lant does not take exception to the jury's findings and, 
therefore, all issues of fact and reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom will be viewed in a light most favor-
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able to the respondent. Tomner's Estate vs. Union 
Paeifir Hail Company, 1~1 Ut. 37, 239 P. 2nd 163. 
Uespondent will limits its statement of facts to 
those conuuencing frmn the time the jury was returned 
to the eourtroom immediately prior to its taking a 
rcl·ess for dinner. There is no useful purpose to be 
served in 1naking a lengthy recitation of the facts sur-
rounding the issues of liability since the jury's findings 
as to liability are not under attack. (Appellant's Brief, 
Page ~). There appears an obvious effort on the part 
of the appellant to invoke the sympathy of this court 
hy setting out testimony of witnesses on issues not 
raised on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, Pages 2 to 7, 
:.?2 and :?a). 
\Yhile the jury was deliberating, the court advised 
counsel that he was going to have the jury returned to 
the courtroom to see if they desired to go to dinner. 
The jury returned to the courtroom at 6:31 P.M. The 
court then stated : 
"The Court: Officers of court, Lady and 
gentlemen, and the parties here are getting hun-
gry. and we were wondering whether we would 
haYe time to eat and what the status of your 
matter and appetite is. I told you you would be 
your own boss, and you are, but we kind of could 
work our program in with yours if we knew how 
you were standing. HaYe you answered some of 
the questions?" 
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The court then went on to ask the foreman of the 
jury, Mr. Oakason, to pass the questions to the sheriff 
so that the court could see the answers that they had 
made .The foreman informed the court that although 
some of the questions had been answered, there were 
no signatures to the verdict. The court then informed 
the foreman that the signatures would not be necessary 
but he would like to look at the answers they had put 
on the questions submitted to them. The answers were 
then viewed by the court. At this point the foreman of 
the jury was attempting to inform the court how the 
jury stood but was not allowed to do so by direct order 
of the court. The foreman stated: 
"MR. OAKASON: Can I tell you what ... " 
"THE COURT: No, don't tell me yet. I 
don't want these fellows to know. I am leaguing 
up with you, but if you can do it in that-can 
you do it in the jury box?" 
"MR. OAKASON: Sure, we are down to one 
question." 
"THE COURT: Okey. You do what you can, 
and then let me take a look at it." (R. 250). 
The verdict was then returned to the fore man of the 
jury, who filled in the answers to the questions that the 
jury had already decided. The verdict was then returned 
to the court. After looking at the verdict a second 
time the court inquired of the foreman as follows: 
"Now, for the two answers that are here, 
would more than six jurors sign that?" 
"MR. OAKASON: Six, yes, sir, or more." 
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• 
.. TilE CO { 'H'f: \Yell, let's have six sign 
that, and then I believe I will have some help 
for you .. \nd if six or Inore have signed each one, 
would you sign at the end thereof as foreman 
too, :\1 r. Oakason." (R. :!50). 
The verdict was then returned to the foreman of the 
jury, who circulated the verdict among the jurors for 
the signatures and then returned the same to the court. 
1\t this point the court viewed the verdict and stated 
as follows: 
"THE COURT: The answers are as fol-
lows, and I will let counsel know and ask you 
to show by the raising of your hand if you have 
agreed with this answer ... " (R. 250). 
The court then went on to read the first two questions 
and answers, and in doing so polled the jury by a show• 
ing of hands as to whether or not the answers of the 
persons signing the verdict, of which they all agreed. 
(R. :!50 and :!51). \Yhen the court reached Question 
X umber 3 and before reading the question the court 
said: 
"Question-There are only five that signed 
Question Number 3. Is there somebody else that 
signed-five can't find that. Is there somebody 
who didn't sign Number 3?" 
"~IR. l"'"NDER\VOOD: That is the one we 
are held up on." 
··~IR. LE\VIS: That is the one we are held 
upon." 
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"MR. OAKASON: That's right." 
"THE COURT: Oh. Well, I can't help you. 
If the answer-if 3 had been answered, I could 
have saved a little time. So there really isn't an 
answer to 3 yet. So my-I was going by the 
answer, assuming that six had agreed. I was in 
error about that, and I would have to let you 
debate further on 3. Now that I have broken into 
your affairs, do you want to do to dinner?" (R. 
251}. 
The court then went on to inquire of the jury as to 
whether or not they desired to go to dinner or have 
dinner sent in. While the matter of going to dinner was 
being discussed a juror inquired of the court concerning 
further evidence. Mr. Pearce stated as follows: 
"MR. PEARCE: Your Honor, I have one 
question. Is there any part of this that we could 
ask a question of you that might help us in our 
decision of this?" 
"THE COURT: Well, I can talk to you 
about the law. You are the sole judges of the 
fact. If the law isn't clear, I could rewrite it or 
maybe explain it. What did you have in mind?" 
(R. 252 and 253). 
Then after further discussion, juror Pearce said: 
"MR. PEARCE: My question is, your Honor, 
and the thing that's been in my mind that I am 
concerned about deeply is they were mopping the 
floor admittedly, but were they spot mopping 
this, or was this a general mop?" 
"THE COURT: Well, now, this is a question 
that the jurors themselves are going to have to 
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• 
detern1ine. I 'rn not permitted to comment on the 
eYidentT or tell you at all. You have to deter-
rnine for yourselves from the evidence what it 
was. and no one can tell you what the fact is. 
Of course, if you don't follow the evidence, it 
would be my duty to give a new trial in the mat-
ter, so you are not permitted just to make up 
things. You haYe to follow the evidence as given. 
If there should be any question in your mind, 
a dispute that you can't settle amongst your-
selves on a factual situation, I suppose the re· 
porter might be able to help you by reading testi-
mony to you." 
--~IH.PEARCE: This would be helpful. I 
would like it.'' 
--~IH. LE\VIS: I think that--" 
"THE COURT: Might solve your question?" 
··~IR. PEARCE: I think it will." 
"THE COURT: Well, what witness did you 
want to know about?" 
--~IR. PEARCE: This would-this would 
have reference I think to the boy that was doing 
the mopping, Coburn." 
"THE COURT: That would be-would it 
be Coburn, Timothy Donald Coburn?" 
"~IR. PEARCE: Yes." 
"THE COl}RT: )!iss Parker, can you find 
his testimony? 1_~ ou still will understand that you 
are the sole judges of the evidence and the fact 
that :\Iiss Parker is reading to you what she 
took down is just to be of help to you. Still it is 
for you to decide what the evidence is and was." 
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"MR. PEARCE: Yes, I understand this, 
sir." 
"THE COURT: All right. Before you read 
it, let me say something else. The fact that we 
are reading this, one man's testimony, isn't to be 
understood as giving any extra emphasis to his 
testimony." 
"MR. PEARCE: Yes, sir." 
"THE COURT: That if there is any doubt 
about what some other witness said, you may 
have that read too." 
"MR. PEARCE: Okey." 
"THE COURT: All right." (R. 253 and 
254). 
The reporter then commenced to read the testimony 
of the witness as requested by the juror. (R. 254 to 
258) . After a considerable portion of the direct testi-
mony of the witness had been read the juror requesting 
this testimony said: 
"MR. PEARCE: I have heard enough." 
"THE COURT: Does anyone want to hear 
more?" (R. 258). 
No one requested any further reading of the testi-
mony of this witness, and plaintiff's counsel made no 
request or voiced any comment in respect to the reading 
of such testimony. (R. 258). The court then again dis-
cussed with the jurors their desires about going to 
dinner. It was decided that the jury would retire to 
a restaurant to have something to eat before further 
10 
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• 
deliberating on the case. Prior to leaving the courtroom 
juror Jlca r<'c stated: 
··Your Honor, why dont' you give us ten min-
utcs and see how we are coming, and then we 
will go eat." 
''THE COURT: All right. Do you want a 
recess-yes.'' 
"~lit CORNELIUS: Your Honor, in that 
question number three, it seems to me that the 
crux of it is a matter of time." 
"THE COURT: That's right." (R. 258}. 
The court then went on to briefly discuss the question 
of going to dinner and it was then indicated by some 
of the jurors that they did not want to further deliberate 
as suggested by juror Pearce. At this point witness 
Lewis stated that in fairness to both parties they should 
not decide the issue by rushing and they should take 
their time and go to dinner. 
"~IH. LE,VIS: I think dinner is the answer." 
"THE COURT: Generally it is." (R. 261). 
After the jurors returned from dinner, they re-
sumed deliberations, and at 10:17 P.M. the jurors 
returned to the courtroom stating to the court that they 
had answered all but the last question. The court ex-
amined the questions and answers affixed thereto and 
announced the findings and directed that a judgment 
be entered in favor of the defendant based upon the 
jury's verdict. (R. 265 to 268). 
11 
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POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIR-
ING OF THE JURY AS TO THE STATUS OF 
THEIR DELIBERATIONS, NOR DID TI-IE 
COURT REQUIRE THE JURY TO DELIBE-
RATE IN OPEN COURT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING THE REQUEST OF A JUROR 
TO HEAR TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE 
WITNESSES. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MIS-
TRIAL OR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 




THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIR-
ING OF THE JURY AS TO THE STATUS OF 
THEIR DELIBERATIONS, NOR DID THE 
COURT REQUIRE THE JURY TO DELIBE-
RATE IN OPEN COURT. 
12 
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-The record clearly reflects that the court, prior to 
the dinner recess, asked the foreman of the jury whether 
or not they desired to go to dinner and incidental there-
to, whether or not they had made any progress in their 
deliberations. ( R. 249). At no time did the court request 
that the foreman divulge the numerical division of the 
jurors voting on any particular question until the fore-
man indicated to the court that six or more of the 
jurors had approved of the answers to all but one of 
the questions. In fact, the court interrupted the foreman 
of the jury and admonished him not to reveal the divi-
sion of the jury on the answers given at that time. (R. 
:!50). The court was told in its discussion with the fore-
man of the jury, that six or more of the jurors had con-
curred in the answers that were made to the interroga-
tories. Upon privately reading the answers to the 
questions submitted to the jury, 'it was apparent to the 
court that the jurors had found that the defendant 
was not negligent and therefore not liable to the plain-
tiff. In the interest of time, the court then handed the 
interrogatories back to the foreman of the jury for 
signatures. 
i\ .. ppellant, in her brief, infers that the court in-
quired of the jury as to the numerical division prior to 
being told that they had answered all but one question 
and that the court was making unnecessary inquiries 
that were coercive. The record clearly shows that such 
inquiry was made only after the court had been told 
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In the case of Railway Express Agency vs. 
Mackay, 181 Federal 2nd 257, 19 ALR 2nd 1248, the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) 
discussed the question of the court's authority to ascer-
tain if the jury is making any progress in their delibera-
tions. In its opinion, the court quotes from the case of 
Allis vs. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 15 Supreme 
Court 36, 39 Lawyers Edition 91, wherein the Supreme 
Court of the United States said: 
"It is a familiar practice to recall a jury, after 
they have been in deliberation for any length 
of time, for the purpose of ascertaining what 
difficulties they have in the consideration of the 
case, and of making proper efforts to assist them 
in the solution of those difficulties. It would be 
startling to have such action held to be error, 
and error sufficient to reverse a judgment." 
This view is also supported by other authorities. 
See 53 American Jurisprudence, Page 651, Section 
904, wherein the author states: 
"It is not error, however, for a trial judge to 
communicate with a jury after they have been 
in deliberation for any length of time, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether they have 
agreed, or as to the reason for their disagree-
mept." 
Counsel for appellant has cited two Federal cases 
wherein the courts disapproved of the practice of the 
trial judge asking the jury as to the numerical division 
of the jury prior to its arriving at a decision. It should 
be noted that the cases cited by the appellant are crimi-
14 
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nal cases requiring a unanimous verdict. Obviously, no 
useful purpose could be served in asking the jury, prior 
to a decision, what number stood for conviction and 
what jurors were for acquittal. In these cases, a unani-
mous verdict is required and no useful purpose is served 
in inquiring about the numerical division. In a civil 
case requiring less than a unanimous verdict, the court, 
of necessity, must inquire of the jury whether or not at 
least three-fourths of the jurors have arrived at a ver-
dict. Otherwise, the court could not be of assistance 
to the jury when assistance was needed. In any event, 
in the instant case, the court did not make any inquiry 
of the jurors until the foreman represented to the court 
that at least six or more of the jurors had agreed to 
the answers placed on the questions. (R. 249-250). 
It should be observed that no deliberations of any 
nature occurred while the jurors were present in the 
courtroom. The record is absolutely silent as to any 
deliberations but reflects only the fact that the answers 
to the questions were signed by the jurors while in the 
courtroom. Rules 47 ( q) and ( r) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that if a verdict is informal 
or insufficient it may be corrected by the jury under 
the advice of the court or the jury may be sent out 
again. In the instant case, the foreman of the jury told 
the court they had arrived at answers to all but one 
question but had not signed the verdict. 
On page 18 of appellant's brief, opposite counsel 
claims that the jurors indicated a coercive impact by 
15 
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stating that they did not wish to rush their deliberations. 
The court did not attempt to rush the deliberations of 
the jury but in fact, to the contrary, advised the1n that 
perhaps going to dinner would give them more chance 
to consider the matter and to resolve their problems. 
The trial court said: 
"THE COURT: Well, we can do a little 
better than that. I suppose we can have the 
chicken-Harman's to send over chicken dinners 
with coffee if you wanted it. If coffee would 
serve, it would take about as much trouble to get 
the coffee as the whole dinner. It wouldn}t take 
you much longer to go eat} and it might do you 
good if you are having problems.}} (R. 251). 
(Emphasis ours) . 
The court then attempted to encourage the jurors to 
take all the time they needed by further saying: 
"THE COURT: If you got out and aired 
and forgot about your problem, maybe when you 
came back you would have a little different atti-
tude. What do yo uthink about that? Would 
that be wise?" (R. 252). 
After the foregoing conversation took place the 
juror, Pearce, requested the court to read the testimony 
of witness Coburn. It was after the testimony of witness 
Coburn that Pearce wanted to speed up the delibera-
tions by suggested that a ten-minute period of delibera-
tions might be sufficient to resolve the matter still 
pending. (R. 258). In response to the suggestion of 
Mr. Pearce, it was then that juror Lewis stated that 
there was no need to rush the deliberations and that 
16 
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-he thought il was a good idea if they go to dinner. To 
this juror T .cw is replied: 
··1 think dinner is the answer." 
The eourt responded by saying: 
"Generally it is." (R. 261). 
The appellant, at page 19 of her brief, infers that 
settlement negotiations were being conducted by the 
pnrties while the jury was deliberating. The affidavit 
of counsel for the respondent completely refutes the 
allegations made by the appellant in this regard. (R. 
71). Opposite counsel intends to mislead this court by 
such assertion for the reason that no offer of settlement 
was ever made by respondent's counsel during the 
course of the trial. In any event, such are not matters 
of record and have no place in a brief on appeal. 
.A.ppellant cites the case of State vs. ~:lartinez, 
i Ut. 2nd 387, 326 P. 2nd 102, in support of her case . 
.. \ review of the facts and law of the Martinez case 
indicates that it was a case concerning the propriety of 
permiting jurors to cross examine witnesses. The case 
is not in point with the instant case and need not be 
further discussed. 
POINT II 
TIIE TRLAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRAXTIXG THE REQLTEST OF A JUROR 
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On page 20 of the appellant's brief, opposite coun-
sel infers that the court directed the reporter to read 
only a portion of the testimony of one of the witnesses. 
This is not an accurate statement of the record as is 
clearly shown by the request of the court that the testi-
mony be read. (R. 254). It was only after the juror 
indicated to the court that no further testimony was 
desired that the reporter discontinued reading her 
notes. The court then inquired: 
"Does anyone want to hear more?" ( R. 258) . 
Counsel for appellant made no request in connection 
with such testimony, and made no comment whatsoever 
in respect to the matter. (R. 258). 
Appellant cites the case of Jenkins vs. Stevens, 64 
Ut. 307, 231 P. 112, stating that it is improper and 
reversible error to allow the reading of a witness's 
testimony while the jury is deliberating. The facts in 
the Jenkins case show that the testimony was read to 
the jury without first notifying counsel for the parties, 
which was contrary to the statute. In the instant case, 
counsel for both parties were present in the courtroom 
when the request was made. Rule 47 ( n) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the fur-
nishing of the jury with the testimony of any of the 
witnesses where there is a disagreement. This court 
approved the reading of a witness's testimony by its 
opinion in the case of State vs. Hines, 6 Ut. 2nd 126, 
307 P. 2nd 887, wherein this honorable court said: 
18 
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-· · ::\ o authority is cited, and we are acquainted 
with none, which holds that the granting of such 
n request is error. On the contrary, the well-
recognized general rule is that it is within the 
trial court's diserdion to grant the jury's request 
to reread parts of the testimony." 
See also an annotation on the subject at 50 ALR 2nd 
176, wherein the author states: 
" . . . in most instances the same general rules 
as to the right to have the reporter's notes read 
to the jury apply to criminal and civil cases 
alike. Thus, the vas! majority of the cases, both 
<.Timinal and civil, adhere to the view that it is 
proper to read such notes to the jury ... " 
Thereafter, appellant further argues Point II of 
her brief with testimony of witnesses concerning facts 
about the alleged injury. It is respectfully submitted 
that such testimony is immaterial and has no bearing 
in the 1natter as the jury found the issues of fact in 
favor of the respondent and the appellant has not taken 
exception in her brief to those findings. 
POINT III 
THE COlTRT DID XOT ERR IN DENY-
IXG APPELLANT'S l\IOTION FOR A MIS-
TRIAL OR IX DEXYIXG APPELLANT'S 
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For the reasons set forth in the arguments of Points 
I and II, the trial court was correct in denying appel-
lant's motions and the same will not be further argued 
by the respondent. Suffice it to say, appellant was not 
deprived of a fair trial. There was no error committed 
by the learned trial judge as will appear from the record 
heretofore cited. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury found the issue of fact in favor of the 
respondent. Those findings are not in question on ap-
peal. If the appellant slipped in the respondent's store 
as she alleged, such was not caused through any negli-
gent act or omission of the respondent, and the jury 
so found. There was ample evidence in the record to 
show that appellant suffered no injury on the premises 
of respondent as she told her physician that she fell 
at work and injured her back. (R. 140 to 143, Exhibit 
23, p. 4) . The trial court did not err in inquiring as to 
the progress of the jury's deliberations or in permitting 
the reporter's notes of the testimony of one witness to 
be read to the jury at their request so as to assist them 
in their deliberations. 
In the case of Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 Ut. 2nd 
389, 360 P. 2nd 176, this honorable court stated: 
"In considering the attack on the findings and 
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to 
follow these cardinal rules of review: To indulge 
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then1 a preslllnption of validity and correctness; 
to re<plirc the appellant to sustain the burden 
of showing error; to review the record in the 
light most favorable to them; and not to disturb 
the1n if they find substantial support in the evi-
dence." 
\ \' e subn1it that no error was committed and the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. Robert Bayle and 
\Yallace R. Lauchnor 
of 
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent-Defendant 
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